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ABSTRACT: As per the conventional wisdom there should be provision for public 
assistance for skill acquirement for achieving higher economic growth and improving 
relative wage inequality in the future. However, empirical observations on certain small 
OECD countries over the period 2000-2011 tell somewhat a different story. The present paper 
develops a simple two-sector, specific factor general equilibrium framework with 
endogenous skill formation and provision for public subsidy on education which shows 
that these atypical empirical observations are theoretically plausible and can possibly be 
used in examining the data empirically to uncover the reality. The analysis questions the 
desirability of the policy on the ground that it may not only aggravate inequality in both 
present and future periods but also does not necessarily improve intertemporal social 
welfare. 
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Public Subsidy on Education, Welfare, and Wage Inequality in a Small 
Open Developed Economy: A Two-period Analysis 
 
1.  Introduction and motivation 
 
The aspect of skill formation is extremely crucial in all countries irrespective of whether 
developed or developing.1 It promotes human capital formation through positive 
externalities which is conducive to economic growth and prosperity of an economy as 
well as has an egalitarian effect because it is likely to lower the difference in wages 
between the two groups of worker differentiated with respect to their skills. The 
conventional wisdom is that skill acquisition, given the size of the workforce, lowers the 
endowment of unskilled labour in the short run and raises the supply of skilled labour in 
the future. In the current period, given other things, national income falls and relative 
wages should move in favour of unskilled labour as the supply of this type of labour 
decreases although the endowment of skilled labour does not change. In the future 
unskilled workers going for skill acquisition in period 1 become skilled and therefore, the 
endowment of skilled labour goes up while that of unskilled labour does not change. 
National income must increase and the wage inequality again should improve because of 
increased supply of skilled labour. If these arguments are valid it logically follows that 
there should be a provision for public assistance for skill acquirement. In the post-reform 
regime, the need for this type of public assistance has become extremely critical in view 
of the empirical evidences of strong symmetrical wage movements against unskilled 
labour in different countries across the globe.2 , 3  
                                                 
1
 Different facets of skill formation have been discussed in works like Autor (2014), Becker 
(1964), Brown et al. (2001), Crouch et al. (1999), Heckman and Krueger (2003), and Vanhuysse 
(2007).  
 
2
 See for example, Harrison and Hanson (1999), Curie and Harrison (1997), Robbins (1995), 
Beyer et al. (1999), Feenstra and Hanson (1997), Wood (1997) and Khan (1998).  
  
3
 In this connection, it is important to mention that Beyer et al.(1999), while studying the 
consequence of trade liberalization on wages in Chile, have found that an increase in the 
proportion of labour force with higher education exerted downward pressure to reduce the 
 3
In this connection, it is extremely important to present some empirical observations on certain 
small OECD countries over the period 2000-2011. Here earnings difference can possibly be 
considered as a proxy for wage inequality. On the other hand, from initial calculations 
carried out on available data for the period 2005-2010, we find that the simple correlation 
coefficients between GDP growth (annual %) and aggregate public spending on 
education (% of GDP) are negative for some small OECD economies.  
 
 
In view of these atypical findings, there is urgent necessity to build up a simple 
theoretical framework, which can show that these observations are theoretically plausible 
and can readily be used in examining the data empirically to unearth the truth. This is 
exactly what has been done in the present paper. We have developed a two sector-three 
factor general equilibrium model with endogenous skill formation and provision for 
public subsidy designed at encouraging acquisition of expertise on the part of the 
unskilled workers for the purpose of our analysis.4 It is a two-period model where the 
number of people going for skill acquisition and hence the supply of unskilled labour in 
period 1 is endogenously determined from the intertemporal utility maximizing behaviour 
of the unskilled working families where the population size including skilled and 
unskilled workers remains the same over time. The question of skill acquisition on the 
part of skilled workers does not arise. Each unskilled working family in its maximization 
exercise takes the wage rates as datum. Although both the wages in period 2 change the 
family cannot foresee them as their decision for skill formation is taken in period 1. In the 
given circumstances, the consequences of the public subsidy provided in period 1 on the 
relative wage inequality in both the periods are examined. The effect of the policy on the 
intertemporal national income has also been scrutinized. We find that the subsidy 
aggravates the inequality in the current period if the high-skill sector is capital-intensive 
                                                                                                                                                 
skilled-unskilled wage inequality. Therefore, as per their findings education had some equalizing 
effects on the wage gap in that country which fortifies the necessity of providing public 
incentives to skill acquisition. 
 
4
 We have basically incorporated endogenous skill formation in an otherwise Jones’ (1971) 
model. 
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and that the policy does not necessarily improve the inequality in the future period.5 
Furthermore, there is no guarantee that the sum of discounted national incomes of the two 
periods increases.  
 
 
The work deserves some attention because of two reasons. First, it provides a tractable 
structure that is capable of theoretically explaining the plausibility of the peculiar 
empirical findings as mentioned earlier. Second, the results of the analysis are interesting 
and can at least question the desirability of public assistance for skill formation especially 
when it may fail to ensure the desired effects on national welfare and wage inequality 
among the different sections of the working class. Nevertheless, these results and the 
appropriateness of the analytical structure are to be empirically examined in details. 
However, performing a rigorous econometric analysis of the available data of the 
countries, taking ‘terms-of-trade (TOT)’, ‘population size’ and ‘openness’ as control 
variables, is beyond the scope of the preset work. It is, therefore, left to future research in 
this area.6  
 
 
 
                                                 
5
 That the difference in distributive shares of capital between high-skill and low-skill sectors play 
a crucial role in determining the final outcome on the relative wage inequality resulting from any 
exogenous shock has been pointed out in many theoretical works like Chaudhuri (2004), Marjit 
and Kar (2005), Chaudhuri and Yabuuchi (2007), Beladi et al. (2008) and Chaudhuri (2008). 
However, Chaudhuri (2008) has found a special case where these distributive shares do not 
matter. Although there are a couple of papers in the literature like Kar and Beladi (2004) and 
Yabuuchi and Chaudhuri (2009) that have introduced skill formation in terms of a separate 
education sector in a static general equilibrium framework and have studied its impact on the 
relative wage inequality we do not come across any theoretical work that has analyzed the 
consequence of  the skill-promoting subsidy policy in a dynamic set-up with endogenous skill 
formation and has simultaneously demonstrated the possibility of its failure in improving both 
wage inequality and social welfare. 
 
6
 The theoretical structure that we have developed here relies heavily on certain assumptions like 
given population size, TOT etc. In reality, however, the TOT index figures and population sizes 
do change over time and the degrees of openness of different countries to international trade vary 
overtime.   
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2. The Model and Analysis 
 
We consider a small open economy with two sectors: low-skill (sector 1) and high-skill 
(sector 2). Sector 1 produces the export commodity ( 1X ) with the help of unskilled 
labour ( L ) and capital ( K ) while sector 2 produces the import good ( 2X ) by means of 
skilled labour ( S ) and capital. Markets are competitive and all the standard assumptions 
including CRS hold. While capital is perfectly mobile intersectorally unskilled labour and 
skilled labour are specific to sectors 1 and 2, respectively. The endowments of both 
skilled labour and capital are given exogenously while the aggregate supply of unskilled 
labour in the economy is endogenously determined. Commodity prices, iP s are given by 
the small open economy assumption. Finally, commodity 1 is taken to be the numeraire.  
 
The economy is endowed with L number of unskilled families each possessing 1 unit of 
labour. The supply of unskilled labour by each family is endogenously determined from 
its intertemporal utility maximizing behavior in period 1. LetW and SW denote the existing 
unskilled and skilled wages, respectively. As SW W>  in period 1, a fraction of family 
labour, Sl  goes for skill formation while the rest, (1 Sl− ) works in the unskilled labour 
market at the wage,W . The family receives a government assistance (subsidy) designed 
at encouraging skill formation at the rate, s for the part of family labour that goes for skill 
formation. There are no direct costs of acquiring skills.7 The family consumes its entire 
income in each period. Hence, the question of savings or borrowing at the time of their 
decision-making (period 1) does not arise. The indirect (opportunity) cost of skill 
formation is (W s− ). The endogenously determined aggregate supply function of 
unskilled labour in the economy in general form is given as follows.8  
                                                 
7
 One can introduce direct costs of acquiring skills which would not affect the basic results of the 
paper. For further details see the concluding section. 
 
8
 It has been derived in Appendix 1. 
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( , , )L L W W sS= with 0; , 0
L L L
W W sS
∂ ∂ ∂
> <
∂ ∂ ∂
.          (1) 
Besides, ( ) 0L WEW W L
∂
= >
∂
; ( ) 0
WL SEW W LS S
∂
= <
∂
; and, ( ) 0L sE
s s L
∂
= <
∂
respectively, 
denote the elasticities of (.)L with respect to , SW W and s , respectively. We present the 
properties of the (.)L function in terms of the following proposition.9 
Proposition 1: Given other determinants, the aggregate supply of unskilled labour in the 
economy is an increasing function of unskilled wage and decreasing in both skilled wage 
and rate of subsidy on skill formation provided in period 1.    
 
The reasons for the signs of the partial derivatives are obvious. An increase (a decrease) 
in unskilled wage,W (rate of subsidy, s ) raises the opportunity cost of acquiring 
skills,(W s− ) and hence leads to higher supply of unskilled labour by each family and 
vice versa. On the other hand, an increase in skilled wage, SW raises the present 
discounted return from skill formation which in turn lowers the supply unskilled labour. 
Note that the number of unskilled working families, L is exogenously given and does not 
change over time.      
 
The general equilibrium structure of the model consists of the following set of equations. 
11 1Wa raL K+ =
         (2)  
2 2 2W a ra PS S K+ =
         
(3)                                      
( ), ,1 1a X L W W sL S=
        (4)                                      
2 2a X SS =
          
(5)                                      
1 1 2 2a X a X KK K+ =          (6)       
                                                 
9
 This result holds in period 2 as well. See proposition 4. 
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where a ji denotes the per unit requirement of the j th input in the i th sector with  
, ,j L S K= and 1,2i =  while r  is the return to capital. Besides, we define ( )j jiji
i
w a
P
θ = as the 
distributive share of the j th input in the i th sector which would be used subsequently in 
stating the results.     
 
Equations (2) and (3) are the two zero-profit conditions for the low-skill and high-skill 
sectors, respectively. Equations (4) – (6) are the full-employment conditions for unskilled 
labour, skilled labour and capital. 
 
Using equations (7) and (8), equation (9) can be rewritten as follows. 
( )1 2, ,
1 2
a aK KL W W s S KSa aL S
+ =
       (6.1) 
This is an indecomposable production system. Factor prices, ,W WS and r are determined 
simultaneously from equations (2), (3) and (6.1) as functions of the system parameters 
including s . Then 1X and 2X are obtained from equations (4) and (5), respectively as a ji s are 
now known.    
 
As W WS > , the absolute wage gap is ( SW W− ) and the relative wage inequality is given by 
ˆ ˆ( )W WS − where Here ‘ ∧ ’ implies proportional change e.g. ˆ ( )
S
S
S
dWW
W
= . The 
skilled−unskilled wage gap improves (worsens) in absolute terms if the gap between SW  and 
W  falls (rises). On the other hand, the wage inequality improves (deteriorates) both in 
absolute and relative terms if ˆ ˆ( ) ( )0.SW W− < >  
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2.1.  Results on wage inequality 
 
Differentiating equations (1) – (3) and (6.1), using (1) and simplifying the following two 
propositions can be ascertained. 
Proposition 2: An increase in the subsidy designed to encourage skill formation lowers the 
supply of unskilled labour in the economy if 1 2
1 2
( )
S
W L K
K SW
E
E
θ θ
θ θ
≥ .10 
Proposition 3: The relative wage inequality worsens (in period 1) due to the subsidy policy 
if 1 2
1 2
( ) 1.
S
W L K
K SW
E
E
θ θ
θ θ
≥ >  On the contrary, it improves if 1 2
1 2
( ) 1.
S
W L K
K SW
E
E
θ θ
θ θ
≥ <   
 
Propositions 2 and 3 can intuitively be explained in the following fashion. If the subsidy 
rate, s  increases there would be a direct negative effect on (.)L . As the supply of unskilled 
labour initially falls, the unskilled wage,W rises and the low-skill sector (sector 1) contracts 
releasing capital to the high-skill sector (sector 2). Consequently, sector 2 expands and 
demands more skilled labour that raises the skilled wage, SW . So, both W and SW increase 
which produce two opposite induced (indirect) effects on (.)L . The supply of unskilled labour 
rises as W rises while it falls as SW increases. Therefore, there are three different effects 
on (.)L . Our analysis shows that the sum of the two negative effects dominates over the 
positive effect of an increase in W  and the net effect would be a fall in the aggregate supply 
of unskilled labour in the economy under the sufficient condition that 1 2
1 2
( )
S
W L K
K SW
E
E
θ θ
θ θ
≥ .       
We have already noted that bothW and SW have increased and sector 1 (sector 2) has 
contracted (expanded). The contracting sector 1 releases capital to sector 2. However, as in 
our model capital is fully utilized, the released capital by sector 1 would be absorbed by 
sector 2 only if its rate of return, r  falls. Thus, r plummets which is also clear from the two 
                                                 
10
 This result also holds in period 2. See proposition 4 in this context. 
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zero-profit conditions (equations 2 and 3). The fall in r  leads to saving on capital cost in 
both the sectors. So, the proportions of increase in W and SW depend on the extent of saving 
on capital costs in the two sectors which in turn depends on their distributive shares of 
capital, Kiθ s. If 2 1( )K Kθ θ> < i.e. if 1 2 1 2( )L K K Sθ θ θ θ> < , the saving on capital cost would be 
higher in sector 2 (sector 1) vis-à-vis that in sector 1 (sector 2) and the relative wage 
inequality worsens (improves).           
 
Period 2 
 
We consider the same broad production system in period 2 also. It has already been 
assumed that the aggregate workforce (skilled plus unskilled) i.e. ( L S+ ) does not 
change over time although their composition changes due to skill formation. In period 2 
unskilled labours that went for skills acquisition (and not working in the unskilled labour 
market) in period 1 becomes skilled labour. So, the endowment of skilled labour 
increases from S (in period 1) to ( (.))S S L L= + − (in period 2) while that of unskilled 
labour remains the same, (.)L . As in our indecomposable production structure all factor 
prices depend on factor endowments apart from commodity prices, , SW W and r would 
take different values in equilibrium and so would be the values of jia s, and jiθ s in period 
2. In order to avoid complications in the use of notations we leave them unchanged.  
 
Equations (5) and (6.1) would now have to be replaced by the following. 
2 2Sa X S=                 (5.1) 
( )1 2, ,
1 2
a aK KL W W s S KSa aL S
+ =
            (6.2) 
where, 
( (.))S S L L= + −
 
 
 
Differentiating equations (1) – (3) and (6.2), using (1) and simplifying the following two 
propositions follow. 
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Proposition 4: Propositions 1 and 2 continue to hold even in period 2. 
Proposition 5: In period 2 the skilled-unskilled wage inequality improves under all situations 
except when 1 2 1 2L K K Sθ θ θ θ< and the ( )
SW
W
ratio is sufficiently high.                    
 
Although the intuitive explanations of proposition 4 remain the same as before those of the 
remaining one would be somewhat different.11 These are as follows. First, let us see what 
happens to the wage inequality in period 2 resulting from skill formation in period 1. Given 
the rate of skills subsidy, s , (or in the absence of any subsidy) the skilled wage, SW falls as the 
supply of skilled labour, S  rises following the joining of skill-acquired unskilled labour in 
the army of skilled workers in period 2. This raises the return to capital, r (equation (3)) 
which in turn lowers the unskilled wage,W (equation (2)). Hence, in complete contrast to our 
findings in period 1, we here find that both the wages fall. The working class irrespective of 
whether skilled or unskilled becomes worse-off. In each of the two sectors the cost on capital 
has increased. What happens to the relative wage inequality now depends on the difference in 
intersectoral distributive shares of capital i.e. jiθ s. The higher the value of jiθ the higher would 
be the fall in the wage rates. Thus, given the rate of skills acquiring subsidy, s  ( 0≥ ) the 
wage inequality rises due to skill formation if 1 2K Kθ θ> . Let us now consider the situation 
where 0s > and s rises. L falls in both the periods while S rises even further. Sector 1 
contracts while sector 2 expands as unskilled labour and skilled labour are specific to those 
sectors, respectively. Consequently, the expanding sector 2 demands more capital while the 
contracting sector 1 releases capital. If 2 1( ) ( )
2 1
a aK K
a aS L
> , the net effect would be an increase 
in demand for capital that raises its return, r . BothW andWS decrease. 
When ( )1 2 1 2L K K Sθ θ θ θ> < i.e. when ( )2 1K Kθ θ> < the proportionate fall inWS would be 
greater (less) than that inW . Hence the wage inequality improves (worsens). However, if 
                                                 
11
 See verbal explanations provided for propositions 1 and 2.  
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2 1( ) ( )
2 1
a aK K
a aS L
< , the net effect would be a fall in the demand for capital that leads to a 
decrease in r .12 Both the wage rates increase. In this case, the wage inequality improves due 
to the subsidy if 1 2 1 2L K K Sθ θ θ θ< .  
 
2.2. Education subsidy and national welfare 
 
We assume that the subsidy for skill formation is financed by non-distortionary lump-sum 
taxes on factor incomes. The national income at world prices in the t th period is then given 
by 
1 2 2
t t tY X P X= +          (7) 
for 1,2t = .  
 
We here consider the discounted sum of national incomes of the two periods as the 
measure of social welfare in this small open economy which is written as follows. 
1 2Y Y Yδ= +                                                                                                              (8) 
where ( 1)δ < is the time discount factor.  
 
Differentiating equations (7), (8) and the production functions the following proposition can 
be easily established.13 
                                                 
12
 The net demand for capital falls in period 2 in the case where 1 2 1 2L K K Sθ θ θ θ< if the 
ratio ( 1)SW
W
> is very low and close to unity. But, in the opposite case we always have 
2 1( ) ( )
2 1
a aK K
a aS L
> sinceW WS > . So, the demand for capital cannot fall in this situation. 
 
13
 This has been proved in Appendix 3. 
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Proposition 6: The subsidy to encourage skill formation does not necessarily improve 
intertemporal social welfare. 
 
Let us now intuitively explain proposition 6 as follows. We have already explained why 
the supply of unskilled labour, (.)L , which remains the same in both periods, is a 
decreasing function of the rate of subsidy, s  if 1 2
1 2
( )
S
W L K
K SW
E
E
θ θ
θ θ
≥ . If s  rises some amount of 
unskilled labour goes out of the production activities in period 1 while the endowments of 
other factors of production remain the same. Quite naturally, the national income in 
period 1 decreases. In period 2 also that amount of unskilled labour is lost but exactly the 
same amount of skilled labour is added to the economy’s resources. As the skilled 
wage, SW is greater than the unskilled wage,W national income in period 2 
unambiguously rises. However, what happens to the intertemporal national 
income,Y must, therefore, depend on the two wages and the discount factor. If the sum of 
discounted unskilled wages in the two periods, 1 2( )W Wδ+  is greater (lower) than the 
discounted skilled wage, 2WSδ intertemporal welfare worsens (improves). This clearly 
depends on the technological and trade-related parameters and the discount factor.      
  
5.  Concluding remarks 
 
This paper has developed a two-sector, specific factor general equilibrium model with 
endogenous skill formation and education subsidy assisting skill acquisition with an eye to 
examine the theoretical plausibility of some recent empirical evidences on certain small 
OECD countries that suggest that public assistance for skill formation may not lead to higher 
economic growth and lower wage inequality in the future. There are two types of labour, 
skilled and unskilled, where unskilled workers have the opportunity to go for skills 
acquisition, become skilled and earn a higher wage in future. The aggregate supply of 
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unskilled labour in the economy is determined from the intertemporal utility maximizing-
behaviour of the unskilled working families in the current period (period 1). The unskilled 
workers after acquiring skills join the army of skilled labour in future thereby increase the 
endowment of skilled labour. The aggregate size of the workforce is assumed to remain 
unchanged over time. A public subsidy designed to promote skill formation lowers the 
supply of unskilled labour in both the periods but raises that of skilled labour in future. The 
analysis has found that an increase in the public subsidy raises the skilled-unskilled wage 
inequality in the present period if the high-skill sector is capital-intensive (in the Jones-Neary 
sense) and may accentuate inequality even in period 2 under certain parametric restrictions.14 
In period 1 both the wages increase while the return to capital falls; thereby leading to a 
redistribution of income in favour of the working class although the income inequality may 
become more uneven among the two groups of the working population differentiated 
according to skills. However, in period 2 both the wages fall while the return to capital 
increases except in a special case that leads to a redistribution of income against the working 
class although their inter-group inequality is most likely to diminish. On the other hand, we 
have also demonstrated that the policy does not necessarily improve intertemporal social 
welfare. Hence, the policy may fail to deliver the goods from the perspectives of both welfare 
and distribution.  
 
Our analysis may be criticized on the ground that some important issues like labour market 
imperfection especially those of unskilled labour, unemployment problem, efficiency wage 
considerations, and collective bargaining have not been captured. Furthermore, we do not 
take into account savings and direct costs associated with skill acquisition and its financing 
problem. Hence, the role of capital market imperfection has not been taken care of. The 
absence of any non-traded skill-intensive sector like services is also a limitation of the 
analysis. If some of these features are taken into consideration the results of the model may 
hold subject to one or two additional sufficient conditions. In defense, we can modestly argue 
that these are some of the salient features of the developing countries and that our structure is 
more appropriate for a small developed country rather than a developing one.  
                                                 
14
 See Jones and Neary (1984).  
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Finally, it should be clearly mentioned that although the analytical framework that we have 
developed can theoretically explain the plausibility of the recent empirical observations on 
certain small OECD countries which are contrary to the common wisdom a rigorous 
econometric analysis of the data has to be carried out in future in order to judge the aptness 
of our theoretical structure. This has been left to future empirical research because it is 
beyond the scope of this paper. However, despite simplicity and abstraction the present 
theoretical analysis deserves some attention because it questions the desirability of providing 
public subsidy to assist skill formation not only from the perspective of improving social 
welfare but also from the view point of lowering the relative wage inequality among the 
different sections of the working population.  
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